II. Abstract
This paper reports on trends in inequality of the distribution of household disposable wealth in West Germany from 1973 to 1998, and it compares the changes in the size distribution of household disposable wealth in West and East Germany between 1993 and 1998. The empirical findings are based on several cross section surveys (Income and Consumption Survey) that are conducted every five years by the German Federal Statistical Office. Since these surveys are large quota samples that exclude the very rich, the institutionalized population and -until 1993 -foreign households as well as equity in private businesses the Gini coefficients derived can be considered lower bounds of the estimates of their true values. We find a decrease of the inequality of disposable household wealth between 1983 and 1993 followed by a slight increase until 1998. There was also a considerable decrease of inequality between 1973 and 1983d but this result may partly be due to the fact that the 1973 figures were adjusted to national totals while the figures for the following years were not. The Gini coefficients for disposable household wealth are about double the coefficients for household disposable income and about three times the coefficients for equivalent disposable income of persons. Except for 1998 net financial assets are less unequally distributed than total disposable wealth but net housing wealth is more unequally distributed. We also find the well known hump shape of relative average wealth holdings of age groups but by looking at the same birth cohorts in the consecutive cross section samples we can show that the relative position of the two oldest birth cohorts deteriorates only slightly in old age. If one changes the perspective to disposable household wealth per household member one finds that there is no reduction in the absolute levels of disposable wealth. This is contrary to the predictions of the life cycle model. Bequests between spouses can be one of the reasons for this surprising result. Looking at inequality within household age groups we see a consistent pattern of highest inequality among the youngest age group that decreases until retirement age and then increases again. This points to inheritances and gifts inter vivo even at young age. Comparing West to East Germany we find greater inequality of the wealth distribution in East Germany but lower inequality of the distribution of disposable income of household and of equivalent income of persons. We can also see a strong tendency to a convergence in the distributions of wealth and income between West and East Germany. Obviously, closing the gap in GDP per capita between West and East Germany comes at the price of increasing inequality in East Germany.
Introduction
In their comprehensive survey of the distribution of wealth Davies and Shorrocks 1 summarized the most important facts about personal wealth holdings known for various countries as follows:
(1) The distribution of wealth is more unequal than that of income, and has a long upper tail.
(2) Many households never accumulate much private wealth, even in rich countries.
(3) Wealth inequality has been on a downward trend for most of the past century.
(4) Financial assets and inherited wealth are both more concentrated than wealth as a whole.
(5) The distribution of inherited wealth is much more unequal than that of wealth in general.
(6) The age-wealth pattern is much less pronounced than predicted by the life cycle hypothesis 2
In this survey information about the distribution of wealth in Germany is very scarce. Only two studies are cited: A first one by Börsch-Supan referring to 1983, and a second one by Burkhauser, Frick and Schwarze referring to 1988 3 . Davies and Shorrocks neglected some 1 Davies and Shorrocks (2000) , pp. 663 and 607.. 2 An earlier survey by Wolff (1991) drew similar conclusions. 3 Davies and Shorrocks (2000) , Table 1 , p. 637. The paper by Burkhauser et al. (1997) is based on the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP). We use the Income and Consuption Surveys (ICS) of the German Federal Statistical Office. For a comparison of these two data sources see Becker et al. (2003) . There are also methodological differencees with respect to the analysis of the concentration of wealth between the Burkhauser et al. paper and our study. The most important differences are: (1) Burkhauser et al. use We restrict the analysis to the conventional concept of marketable household wealth which we call -following the terminology used by Wolff -household disposable wealth 6 . The unit of measurement is either the household and its disposable wealth or the person with its disposable wealth per household member.
The paper is organized as follows:
4 Ring (2000, pp. 200-252) gives an overview of earlier studies. 5 Although there are some other data sources a cross-section time series can only be constructed from the Income and Consumption Surveys. There is a good chance that this time series can be continued in the near future because by the end of 2004 data from a new Income and Consumption Survey (ICS) referring to 2003 will become available. Furthermore, in 2002 the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) conducted a special wealth survey the data of which will become available for analysis by the end of 2003 5 . While the GSOEP data can be used anywhere by the international research community on a contractual basis, micro-data of the German Federal Statistical Office presently can only be analyzed within Germany due to legal restrictions. 6 Wolff (1991, p. 94 ) describes household disposable wealth as including "assets and liabilities that have a current market value and that are directly or indirectly marketable (fungible). A typical list of assets includes owneroccupied housing and other real estate; consumer durables and household inventories; cash checking and savings accounts; bonds, and other financial instruments; corporate stocks or shares; the equity in unincorporated businesses; trust funds; and the cash surrender value of life insurance policies and pension plans". It has to be noted, however, that the following results for Germany generally neglect consumer durables.
The first three sections are restricted to West Germany for which we can construct a time series from 1973 to 1998. At first, we present measures of the level and the overall trend of the inequality of household disposable wealth and household disposable income as well as equivalent disposable income of persons. This is followed by a critical discussion of the various shortcomings of the data source that do not allow to take the results at face value. Then we deal separately with inequality in the distribution of financial assets and housing as the two main components of disposable wealth of the vast majority of households. In the next section we look at the distribution of average disposable wealth, and its dispersion by age groups as distinguished by the age of the head of household. The final section will analyze the distribution of disposable wealth and its components in East Germany following a brief introduction to the main institutional changes that accompanied German reunification We conclude by some speculations about future trends of wealth inequality. 7 The cut-off values for net monthly household income used by the Federal Statistical Office were DEM 15,000 in 1973 , DEM 20,000 in 1978 , DEM 25,000 in 1983 and 1988 , DEM 35,000 in 1993 . As can be derived from Merz' (2001) analysis based on income tax records households with a monthly net income of more than DEM 8,000 are grossly underrepresented in the Income and Consumption Surveys. Merz found that about 270,000 "rich" households were missing from the grossed-up figures of the Income and Consumption Survey 1998. In the mid-nineties these were about 0.75 % of all households in unified Germany. The income of approximately 37,000 of these households exceeded the cut-off line. Therefore, they were not covered by the survey for methodological reasons. (Stein 2002, p. 9) . The respective estimate of the Deutsche Bundesbank which includes wealth holdings of the non-profit sector is 8.6 trillion (Deutsche Bundesbank 1999, p. 43) . Remembering that wealth holdings of the non-profit sector are included in the estimate of the Deutsche Bundesbank, and that the wealth holdings of the very rich are excluded from the ICS both estimates are surprisingly close.
Inequality of disposable wealth across households in West Germany from 1973 to 1998
Comparing the Gini coefficients for disposable wealth and disposable income of households one finds that this measure is much lower for income inequality than for wealth inequality, with a value of mostly less than a half.. When one looks at the Gini coefficient for equivalent disposable income of persons this measure in all years is approximately one fifth lower than that for household disposable income, a typical fact shown in many studies of income distribution. This corroborates for Germany the findings summarized by Davies and Shorrocks as to the level of inequality of household disposable wealth and household disposable income.
We also presume a long tail of the wealth distribution in Germany but we cannot show it.
Another way of looking at the inequality of disposable wealth is to ascertain the share of the top 1 %, top 5 %, and top 10 % of households in total disposable wealth. This is the strategy often used to characterize trends in wealth inequality because only figures for the very wealthy households are available in some countries (Wolff 1996 , Shorrocks 2000 . Obviously, these measures focus attention on a small segment of the population, which may be of interest from a certain political point of view. These measures, however, don't capture the wealth distribution across the entire population that is also important, especially in Germany, which since several decades enacted a policy of promoting the spread of wealth holdings among the middle classes 13 . Decile share distributions contain information for both views. Table 2) The lowest decile shows negative disposable wealth. Since the value of consumer durables is not included consumer loans obviously are higher than available financial assets. More generally, we can observe that the lowest four deciles possess only a negligible share of total dis-12 The ICS also exclude the institutionalized population and the homeless but this seems less of a problem for wealth studies. 13 Ring (2000) Comparing these results for West Germany with figures for several other countries referring to the mid-eighties that are reported in Wolff (1996) one can gather from Table 3 that the shares of the two bottom quintiles are everywhere extremely low. Slight differences may be due to the inclusion of some consumer durables in some countries.
(Here Table 3) In West Germany the share of the third quintile is lowest but the share of the fourth quintile is highest. There seems to be a broader upper middle class of wealth holders in Germany than in other countries. This presumption is corroborated by looking at the shares of the top quintiles.
The share of the top quintile is lower in Germany and in Canada than in the US and in Sweden with Australia somewhere in the middle. This can only be a tentative conclusion, however, since in Germany the share of the top quintile is biased downwards as mentioned before.
14 Stein (2003, section 3.1.4.3) estimates that this group of top wealth holders owns about 5 % of total disposable wealth. If this group were included in the ranking it would increase the share of the top decile by about 4 % to 5 %.
When we look at the development of the Gini coefficients in Table 1 , and also at the changes of the shares of the two top deciles in The figures for 1988, 1993 and 1998 also neglect the top wealth holders, and, additionally, the equity in private businesses. Only stocks that are traded at the stock exchange were included.
Since it can be assumed that equity in private businesses is concentrated in the top decile, both these facts contribute to a downward bias of the Gini coefficients, and of the shares of the top deciles in these years. 17 .
In 1993 the ICS for the first time included foreigners living in Germany. In West Germany they made up around 9 % of the resident population. Although there are indications that only the better integrated foreigners participated in the surveys it can be assumed that they mostly belonged to the lower wealth deciles 18 . This means that the values of the Gini coefficient referring to the years 1993 and 1998 -if restricted to the German population -would be somewhat lower than their values for the resident population as shown in Table 1 19 .
It depends on the theoretical question pursued whether one wants to refer to the total resident population in each year or only to a subset of it in determining the trend in wealth inequality.
We prefer to look at the resident population because in a period of globalization one can no longer abstract from migration. We consider, therefore, the Gini coefficients for 1983 and 1988, which excluded foreigners, as a little downward biased in addition to the other biases mentioned.
Given the available evidence, and taking all these arguments together, we cannot corroborate for Germany a strong tendency of decreasing inequality of household disposable wealth between 1973 and 1998. But for the decade from 1983 to 1993 for which the Gini coefficients (calculated by excluding equity of private businesses) are better comparable we can ascertain 1983 was somewhat too high because it was estimated from information for a region of Germany with above average house prices. The market value of owner occupied houses and apartments for 1993 and 1998 was estimated by the owners. It should also be noted that Stein after correcting for the too high value of the multiplier for housing and some other elements arrives at a somewhat lower value of the Gini coefficient of 68.3 % in 1983 (Stein 2003, Table 3.19) . 18 During the eighties and nineties Germany experienced considerable immigration, mostly from non-EU countries. Net immigration between 1980 and 1990 amounted to about 800,000 persons. Between 1991 and 1997 another 1.5 million persons came into united Germany. The most important groups of immigrants were family members joining their already present spouses who originally came into the country as so-called guest-workers, repatriates from former socialist countries, refugees and asylum seekers. In general, these immigrants came with no or very little wealth. Enquete-Kommission (1998), 
Inequality of the distribution of net financial assets and net housing wealth across households in West Germany 1983 to 1998
When one disregards equity in incorporated and unincorporated private businesses, except traded stocks that are included in financial assets, then total disposable household wealth can be split up into net financial assets and net housing wealth. "Net" means that consumer debts are deducted from the gross sum of financial assets, and housing debts are deducted from the gross value of housing and real estate. It is interesting to note that the share of net financial assets in total disposable wealth was about one quarter, rising from 22.1 % in 1983 to 27.6 % in 1998. Correspondingly, the share of the net value of housing wealth decreased during this period from 77.9 % to 72.4 % despite the fact that the ownership rate for housing wealth increased from 45.5 % in 1983 to 49.1 % in 1998 after a high of 50.7 % in 1993 20 . Thus the ownership rate for houses in Germany is far lower than for financial assets of all kinds, which may be over 90 %, although many households own only small amounts.
For these two broad categories of household wealth we can also ask what is the level of inequality, and was this period characterized by a clear trend in inequality. Table 4 shows the results:
(Here Table 4) 20 Stein (2002) , Table 4 , p. 11 and Table 6 , p. 12. The decrease in the ownership rate of housing wealth between 1993 and 1998 seems to be due to net immigration because immigrants usually are not able to acquire housing wealth within a short period after immigration for lack of financial assets they bring with them.
We can gather from Table 4 that net financial wealth is less unequally distributed than total disposable wealth except in the last year of our series, 1998. This lower concentration of financial assets could be expected since households with low net wealth usually keep their assets in the form of bank accounts, savings accounts with banks or housing associations, or in life insurance plans. Since in Germany the prices of apartments and houses are rather high compared to average net income one needs a large amount as a down payment to acquire
property. This is the main reason why ownership rates of housing are low compared to other countries. It is not astounding, therefore, that net housing wealth is more unequally distributed than total disposable wealth in each year. There was a noticeable trend of decreasing inequality of net housing wealth, at least until 1993, but inequality of net financial wealth displayed an upward trend. It should also be noted that the lower inequality of net financial wealth compared to total disposable wealth until 1993 is not in line with the "stylized facts" summarized by Davies and Shorrocks (2000, p. 607 ) but seems to be very plausible for Germany.
Inequality of wealth holdings between and within age groups 21
The simple life-cycle model predicts that personal disposable wealth at the beginning of working life of each cohort is zero for all members of a cohort, which implies also complete equality 22 . In the course of working life wealth is accumulated according to the possibilities and the willingness to save from unequally distributed earned incomes. Personal disposable wealth is highest at retirement age, and inequality of the distribution of personal wealth is also Burkhauser et al. (1997, Tab. 5 ) compare the ownership rates of houses and apartments between Germany and the US by age group and by gender. At the end of the eighties the overall US rate are about one third higher than the German rate. 21 We distinguish age groups, i.e. households or household members according to the age of the head of household, from cohorts, i.e. households or members of households with the same years of birth of the head of household.
highest. During the retirement period disposable wealth is steadily decreased to finance consumption, and, therefore, inequality of wealth holdings is also continuously reduced. At the time of death personal disposable wealth is again reduced to zero, and equality of wealth holdings is restored. To come closer to reality many factors have to be integrated into this simple life-cycle model. The first factor at the person level is the distribution of earnings and its determinants. The second factor at the person level are the rates of return for accumulated wealth, and capital gains or losses. Marriage and divorce behavior, e.g. class specific mating or random mating, and differential fertility that influences the possibility to save are the main factors if one changes from the person to the household level. The propensity to save may be influenced by the tax system and by the social protection system, which covers social risks on a broader or smaller scale and with higher or lower benefits. Uncertainty about the expected life time income and about the life span of the individuals or, in case of a couple, of both spouses introduces the precautionary motive into the considerations about wealth accumulation and decumulation, and, finally, the bequest motive and the legal rules for the division of estates including the motive to invest in the children's education and to support their start in life by gifts inter vivo may play a role, at least for couples with children or close relatives 23 .
Elaborated models that include most of these factors often yield inconclusive results as to the accumulation or decumulation of household wealth after retirement and the effects of bequests on the inequality of the wealth distribution. Davies and Shorrocks (2000, p.616 22 Under the assumption of perfect capital markets with the possibility to borrow on future earnings initial wealth personal holdings at the beginning of working life would even be negative and debts would be unequally distributed.
by various age groups, distinguished by the age of the head of household. Second, the changes in average wealth holdings of two pseudo cohorts of households at different ages of the head of household, which can be constructed from the available time series of the ICS. Third, we look at the inequality of wealth holdings within the various age groups.
Diagram 1 displays for four years average levels of holdings of disposable wealth of various age groups of households 24 as proportion of the respective overall average disposable wealth.
(Here Diagram 1)
One sees the well known hump shape. In every ICS sample one middle aged group has the highest relative wealth position. But the respective age group is not the same. In the ICS of 1983 it is the group at the age between 50 and 54 years, and in the ICS of 1998 it is the group at the age of 60 and 64 years.
But household size changes over the life course. Therefore, it is interesting whether this shape remains the same if we look at household disposable wealth per household member. To be comparable to the previous approach all members of a household are classified according to the age of the head of household irrespective of their own age. From Diagram 2 we can see much less of a hump.
(Here Diagram 2)
A decrease in relative average wealth holdings is only visible for the age group over 65, the mandatory retirement age in German. The ICS of 1993 presents even an exception because there is no decrease at all. Obviously, this flattening of the hump is the effect of changing household size, especially in old age, when one spouse dies and leaves most or all of its personal wealth to the surviving spouse. It seems obvious, that the bequest motive should not 23 For an overview of the relevant factors see Davies and Shorrocks (2000) , pp. 608-627. 24 The households are classified according to the age of the head of household.
only be discussed with respect to children but also modeled with respect to surviving spouses to improve the explanatory power of models of wealth accumulation and distribution. much to keep up with average growth of disposable wealth per person. Moreover, for both cohorts we don't find a absolute reduction of wealth holdings in monetary terms. This means that on average there was no dissaving at the person level. The decrease that was observed at the household level is to a large extent compensated for by changes in household size, and, presumably, by bequests to surviving spouses 27 . We can conclude, therefore, that in Germany because of the rather well developed pension system, and a social insurance provision for the cost of nursing in old age, there is no evidence that the oldest cohort on average is running down its disposable wealth to a great extent. The bequest motive -or other considerationsseems to be very strong.
If disposable wealth were completely self-accumulated from current income young generations would possess little wealth, and the distribution of wealth among them would be rather equal. Inequality would develop during the life course, and it would decrease after retirement when wealth is run down to finance consumption in old age. Therefore, one can get some insight into the deviations from this simple hypothesis if one checks the distribution of disposable wealth within age cohorts. Table 5 shows the results for West Germany for the years 1983 and 1998.
(Here Table 5 )
In all age groups the distribution of household disposable wealth at the household level is a little more unequal than that at the person level but displays the same pattern. In 1983 inequality was highest within the youngest age group, then it decreased until retirement age, and finally it increased again 28 . In 1998 inequality within age groups was in every group considerably lower than in 1983 but the same pattern emerges. Highest is inequality among the young households, it decreases until retirement age, and then it increases increase. This pattern is exactly the opposite of what one would expect. If one wants to explain this pattern one has to look especially at inheritances and gifts inter vivo that some members of the youngest age group have already received.
We can only hint at some facts known for West Germany. Based on data from the GSOEP (wave 1988) Schlomann (1992, Tab. 8.1, p. 248) estimates that 8.5 % of the households of the youngest age group had already received inheritances during their life time. The proportion increases to 14.4 % of the age group between 30 and 44 years, 21.1 % of the age group between 45 and 64 years, and is lower again for the oldest cohort over 65 years. One has to note, however, that the participants of the GSOEP were asked for inheritances they received since 1960, i.e. during the past 28 years. This would include all of the inheritances of the youngest age group but to a lesser extent those of the older age groups. Based on the ICS Stein (2003, Tab. 3.23 ) finds for 1998 that among the households of the top decile about 27.5 % mention that houses or apartments they possess were inherited or given to them as a gift inter vivo.
Among the entire population only 8.9 % of the households declare that they have inherited houses or apartments. This is about a fifth of all home owners. From this fragmentary information we can derive the tentative conclusion that inheritances and gifts inter vivo play an important role for overall inequality of disposable household wealth, even among the youngest age group. For a considerable group of the population the so-called original accumulation,
i.e. the accumulation of wealth by saving from own earned income is by far not the only source of the wealth they hold in old age. This seems especially true for the top wealth holders.
Inequality of disposable household wealth in East and West Germany compared.
In 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany was founded on the territory the American, British and French Allied Forces had occupied, and a so-called social market economy was established. In contrast, the Soviet Government in collaboration with the German Communist Party established the socialist German Democratic Republic in the Soviet zone. Enterprises and farms were expropriated and transformed to state owned so-called industrial combinats and agricultural cooperatives. Private property of means of production was no longer allowed.
Larger houses that could be let to renters also became state property or the property of housing cooperatives. The GDR introduced a planned economy run by the state authorities and with its own non-convertible currency (Mark). The economy was integrated into the Eastern block.
Step by step the border controls were tightened to stop a continuous flow of emigrants from East to West Germany. In 1962 the Berlin Wall was erected to close the last loophole for emigration. During the course of the years the East German economy lagged more and more behind the development in the Western World, and economic and political difficulties mounted in all the socialist states. It is up to the historians to exactly gauge the various factors that led to the break-down of the Socialist block. In Germany the Berlin Wall fell in November 1999, and within a few days all the border controls were cancelled. It took only a few month until a Parliament was elected democratically in East Germany that started to transform the East German economic and social system. In spring 1990 this Parliament decided to reunite East Germany with West Germany. The West German Government and the Four Powers accepted this decision, and within a few month a reunification treaty was concluded, detailing how the economic and social system of East Germany could be transformed to fit the West German Constitution (Grundgesetz) and her social order.
In July 1990 a monetary union was concluded substituting the East German currency by the Deutsche Mark. Wages and other current incomes as well as prices were converted on a 1 to 1 basis. Monetary assets and liabilities were converted 2 to 1 with the exception of savings of M 6,000 per person, which were also converted 1 to 1. Foreign debts of the German Democratic Republic were to be paid back by united Germany. State property of the production sector and of land was privatized by a new organization called Treuhandanstalt. Contrary to the expectations, this process resulted in a deficit of about 300 billions Deutsche Mark. Land, houses, and companies, which had been expropriated, were restituted in kind. The West German legal system was introduced including the labor market regulations, the social protection system, and the tax system. Special regulations guaranteed a minimum income in case of unemployment and retirement. Very generous early retirement regulations and special employment measures were also introduced. Despite the 1 to 1 conversion of the East German currency, the wage level amounted to a little less than 50 % of the West German average wage in 1991. East German pensions were tied to the East German wage level, and, consequently, were also very low although pensioners gained considerably -relative to workers -by the change of the old age protection system. During the first half of the 90s West German financial aid to East Germany increased from 100 billions D-Mark in 1991 to 125 billions in 1995.
In 1991 these transfers amounted to roughly 4 % of the West German but 50 % of the East German Gross Domestic Product. These West-East transfers were partly channeled through social security institutions, and partly through direct transfers from West German to East German budgets. West-East transfers are still continuing on a large scale, which explains part of Germany's problems with budget deficits. The economy in the Eastern part of reunited Germany is still lagging far behind in productivity and income growth. It may take another 20 years until the discrepancy between the Eastern and the Western parts of Germany will be reduced to a politically negligible difference.
It does not come as a surprise that the transformation from a socialist system to a social market economy had serious consequences for the distribution of disposable household wealth, not only at the time of reunification but also for a long time to come 29 . (Here Table 6 )
We see again that inequality of the distribution of disposable household wealth in much greater than inequality of disposable incomes of households or equivalent income of persons.
Surprisingly the distribution of disposable wealth of households is more unequal in East Germany than in West Germany but the distribution of disposable household income and of equivalent income of persons is less unequal. While in East Germany inequality of disposable wealth was decreasing from 1993 to 1998 it was increasing in West Germany. Household disposable income as well as equivalent disposable income became considerably more unequal in East Germany while inequality in West Germany increased only very little. On all counts, therefore, we can see a tendency of convergence.
(Here Table 7 ) Table 7 presents the decile shares of household disposable wealth. In East Germany the top decile lost while the fifth to the ninth decile increased their shares. In West Germany the three top decile gained while all the lower deciles lost. 29 In comparing East and West Germany one can look either at the population resident in the former GDR in 1989 irrespective of the residence at the time of the survey (principle of origin) or one can look at the population resident on the territory of the former GDR (principle of territory). This makes a difference if there is considerable migration between the two parts of Germany which still is the case. In what follows we stick to the principle of territory.
It is interesting to look also at the distribution of the two main components of disposable wealth: Net financial wealth and net housing wealth.
(Here Table 8 ) Table 8 shows that inequality of net financial wealth has increased more in East Germany than in West Germany, and that it has come close to the West German level. A much greater discrepancy exists with net housing wealth although there is also a slight tendency of convergence. Differences in the distribution of net housing wealth seem to be the main reason for greater inequality of disposable household wealth in East Germany. This can be explained by a much lower proportion of house and land owners in East Germany 30 , and a tremendous rise of land prices after unification when land and house prices were no longer fixed by the Government at a very low level but market prices were allowed.
Since ownership of means of production, especially equity in private businesses and large land holdings, were not allowed in the former German Democratic Republic, and, therefore, could not be inherited or received as gifts inter vivo, one could hypothesize that the distribution of disposable wealth among age groups would be much closer to the life cycle model than in West Germany. Table 9 shows that this hypothesis can not be supported.
(Here Table 9 )
On the contrary, in 1998 the pattern of inequality within age groups that emerges from Table   9 is even more pronounced in East Germany than in West Germany. We find highest inequality among the group of young households, decreasing with age until retirement age, and then increasing again. This means that one decade after unification the East German pattern of household wealth distribution within age groups has approached the West German pattern 30 In 1993 the proportion of home owner households in East Germany was only 27.4 % compared to 50.7 % in West Germany. Until 1998 it increased to 33.9 % in East Germany while it fell in West Germany to 49.1 %.
quite closely. Obviously, a convergent the tendency between East and West Germany cannot only be found at the macro level of GDP per capita but also from various perspectives of inequality analysis. The price for narrowing the gap in GDP per capita is more inequality of the distributions of income and wealth.
Conclusions
The results presented show that the inequality of the distribution of household disposable wealth is somewhere in the middle of industrialized countries. Inequality has decreased slightly from 1973 to 1993, and then increased again. East German inequality of the distribution of disposable household wealth and of disposable household income is converging to the West German levels although from different starting points. We can expect a further increase in inequality of disposable household wealth for two reasons: First, since a further retrenchment of the welfare state is under way this will force the long-term unemployed, the prematurely disabled, and early retirees to run down their household wealth for consumption during their working life thus increasing the proportion of households with little or no wealth holdings. Additionally, it will make it more difficult for those with reduced social transfers to accumulate wealth. Second, the inheritances due during the two decades to come will be much larger than in earlier years, and they will be distributed more unequally because the number of heirs within families is considerably smaller than in former times due to the decrease in birth rates. It is still an open question whether political decisions under discussion, like a reduction of the highest marginal tax rate, a permanent abolition of the former wealth tax, a loosing of the anyway rather loose taxation of capital gains, and a reduction of the inheritance tax will increase this trend to more wealth inequality in Germany. (Hauser/Stein 2001, p.120) . While in the former German Democratic Republic it was very difficult to keep up houses which resulted in a deterioration of the buildings land kept its value. 
